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“[I]f the purpose is one of drawing the constitutional limits on 
the taxing power, would it not be meaningful to utilize a 
worst-case scenario and to see model governments, 
anywhere and everywhere, as revenue-maximizing? That is, 
given any revenue source, would it not be best to assume 
maximal exploitation?”  
James M. Buchanan 1992, p.105. 
 
“You must only take care to remove all the vices. If you 
remove part, you may render the matter worse. … For 
whatever may be the consequences of such a miraculous 
transformation of mankind, as would endow them with every 
species of virtue, and free them from every species of vice; 
this concerns not the magistrate, who aims only at 
possibilities. He cannot cure every vice by substituting a 
virtue in its place. Very often he can only cure one vice by 
another; and in that case, he ought to prefer what is least 
pernicious to society.” David Hume 1985b [1752], pp.279-80. 
I. Introduction 
Worst-case theorizing about government has a lengthy history in political economy 
(Levy 2002; Toma and Toma 1984). David Hume provides the classic statement of worst-
case theorizing about government in political economy: “Political writers have established it as 
a maxim, that, in contriving any system of government, and fixing the several checks and 
controuls of the constitution, every man ought to be supposed a knave, and to have no other 
end, in all his actions, than private interest” (Hume 1985a [1752], pp.42-43). Hume’s worst-
case model of government has attained canonical status in the contemporary constitutional 
political economy literature (see, e.g., Levy 2002; Brennan and Buchanan 1980, 1985; Sutter 
1998; Faria 1999).   
J. M. Buchanan – a founding father of constitutional political economy – is (perhaps) 
uniquely responsible for the revival of worst-case theorizing about government in modern 
political economy (see, Levy 2002). 1 Worst-case theorizing about government à la Buchanan 
necessitates adherence to a principle of motivational homogeneity or symmetry: private and 
public chooser alike are modelled as pursuing their private interest. Failure to model private 
and public chooser symmetrically will, of course, unduly bias one’s analysis in favour of 
private or public choice per se (Buchanan 1987, p.85, pp.89-90). Just as knavery (the 
workings of self-interest) may generate market failure in a private choice context (e.g., 
externalities, private provision of public goods, and monopoly), we have no reason to think 
                                                 
1 “[The] Leviathan assumption appears to be at the heart of the classical conception of constitutional 
government.” (Toma and Toma 1984, p.93). Brennan and Buchanan view their Leviathan model of 
government as exemplifying “the [worst-case] spirit of the classical political economists” (2000 [1980], 
p.220). James Mill’s 1820 model of government as slave-driver writ large is remarkably similar to the 
Leviathan model of government provided by Brennan and Buchanan in the late 1970’s. Indeed, the 
suggestion that one model government as slave-driver was not unique to Mill: “Every Monarch is a 
Slave-holder upon the largest scale” (Bentham 1989 [1822], p.171). Toma and Toma (1984, p.93) 
suggest that the Brennan-Buchanan Leviathan model “seems to apply naturally to a monarchial form of 
government.” 
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that said knavery will not similarly generate government failure when operative in any public 
choice context (Buchanan 1962, 1979a, p.77). 2       
Buchanan is perhaps the most important advocate in modern economics of what we 
might term analytical egalitarianism. Analytical egalitarianism requires that all – whether black 
or white, master or servant, planner or kulak – be modelled symmetrically: any differences in 
their observed behavior lying not in any supposedly intrinsic preferences or abilities (or their 
national character per se), but rather in their historically contingent budget sets.3 Analytical 
egalitarianism thus lies at the core of worst-case thinking in political economy. A key lesson of 
Buchanan’s worst-case philosophy of constitutional political economy is that one ought not 
judge the desirability of political institutions4 simply on the basis of their performance under 
ideal – or best-case – conditions (see, e.g., Brennan and Hamlin 2000, pp.124-125; Levy 
2002), but rather, that one ought to evaluate them in accordance with their performance under 
decidedly less than ideal – or worst-case – conditions (the prevalence of Hume’s political 
knaves for example). Thus, a policy which might prima facie appear optimal if we suppose 
that policymakers are wholly public-spirited may prove decidedly less than optimal when 
policymakers are rather more self-interested than we earlier supposed.  
In this chapter we revisit the socialist calculation debate of the 1930s and 1940s. Our 
re-examination of the debate is squarely grounded in the tradition of Buchanan and Hume’s 
worst-case political economy.  Traditional accounts of the calculation debate center around 
the knowledge or quality of information (or lack of such) characterizing the putative socialist 
planner’s information set (see, e.g., Steele 1992).  We view the interwar calculation debate as 
providing a rather useful framework, however, within which critically to scrutinize the 
coherence (or lack of such) associated with various approaches to worst-case and best-case 
theorizing in political economy respectively. In particular, we argue that the Austrian ‘socialist 
calculation’ argument (Mises 1935 [1920]; Hayek 1945) is not a ‘best-case’ or ‘worst-case’ 
critique per se of socialist planning, but rather, that the desirability (or otherwise) of socialist 
calculation is not independent of the assumptions we make about the planner objective 
function. Thus, rather than questioning the information or knowledge (Hayek 1945) available 
(or otherwise) to economic planners or other public choosers, however, we follow the worst-
case political economy tradition in public choice theory (especially the work of say, J. M. 
Buchanan or Gordon Tullock) by largely focusing upon worst-case motivational suppositions: 
private and public chooser alike are homo economicus always and everywhere. 5 By taking 
planner self-interest (or conversely, planner benevolence) seriously we provide a rather novel 
interpretation of the interwar calculation debate. In particular, we challenge a variety of 
important Austrian political economy conclusions. 
                                                 
2 “[T]he economist who utilizes homo economicus, who can identify market failure … is under an 
obligation to identify government or political failure” (Buchanan 1979a, p.77).  
3 “From Adam Smith through John Stuart Mill, classical economists presumed that, for purposes of 
analysis, people are the same” (Levy, Peart, Farrant, 2005, p.3).  
4 Alternative sets of ‘rules of the game’, to invoke Buchanan’s favored term 
5 “The incompatibility of the incentive structure was not a central feature of the socialist calculation 
debate of the 1930’s” J. M. Buchanan (2001, p.235) 
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Participants in the socialist calculation debate of the 1930’s and 1940’s - whether 
favorable to market socialism or otherwise - modeled public choosers as rather more akin to 
what Buchanan characterizes as non-Homo Economicus than Hume’s knave: Thus 
Buchanan’s rather pungent remark that the caricature of “socialist bureaucrat … [as] non-
Homo economicus in the purest sense … [has been present] in much serious discussion of 
real world policy” (1999 [1969], p.88) provides a wholly apt characterization of the calculation 
debate.  Consequently, we may view Mises and Hayek, along with their market socialist 
opponents, as having subscribed to a supposition of motivational asymmetry during the 
socialist calculation debate: public choosers (planners) were modeled as public-spirited while 
private-choosers, by contrast, were supposed self-interested.  Where worst-case theorists like 
Buchanan and Hume model all in accordance with worst case motivational assumptions, 
Hayek and Mises appear to suppose that planner and kulak have asymmetric motivations.  
Austrian political economy6 has traditionally posed the question as to whether 
socialist planners can allocate resources to attain any semblance of first-best efficiency.  
Here, however, we ask whether the assumption of low ‘calculative efficacy’7 might prove 
desirable. Is high calculative efficacy desirable per se, or is any such desirability rather a 
function of whatever planner type (whether benevolent or self-interested) we suppose, 
conjunct with the particular welfare metric we invoke? To illustrate our argument we contrast 
the Austrian and public choice critiques of socialist economic planning. The Austrian critique 
of planning faults public-choice theory for its purported failure to accept the logic of the 
Austrian economic calculation argument (see, e.g., Lavoie 1985a, p.102): Ludwig von Mises 
showing in 1920 that socialist planners (even the public-spirited variety) were logically 
precluded from rationally organizing production to attain any semblance of first-best efficiency 
whatsoever, due to their inability to accurately calculate relative scarcities and opportunity 
costs without market prices for capital goods. Mises argues that the inability of planners to 
engage in rational socialist calculation guarantees pervasive economic inefficiency.  The 
public choice critique of planning, however, emphasizes the perverse incentives that lead self-
interested planners to generate pervasive artificial shortages, given that planning seems akin 
to monopoly writ large. Shortages, of course, allow planners to systematically extract bribes 
and other perquisites (all akin to artificial scarcity rents) from goods-starved consumers (see, 
e.g., Levy 1990; Shleifer and Vishny 1992).  
Section II contrasts the Austrian and public choice critiques of socialist planning, 
drawing particular attention to the markedly divergent empirical predictions associated with 
Austrian and public choice critiques respectively regarding the operation of real world Soviet-
type ‘planning’. Section III argues that perfect information is a worst-case assumption if we 
suppose that planners are self-interested. Where planners are non-benevolent, we suggest 
                                                 
6 e.g., the contributions of Mises and Hayek during the socialist calculation debate 
7 Calculative efficacy refers to the degree to which the central planner is able to overcome the Mises -
Hayek economic critique of socialist planning. If calculative efficacy is low, the Mises -Hayek critique 
significantly constrains planner ability to allocate resources efficiently; conversely, if calculative efficacy 
is high, the Austrian critique does not hinder the planner.  
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that imperfect information possesses second-best efficiency type properties.  We draw upon 
the preceding analysis in Section IV to provide a sketch of ‘robust’ political economy, paying 
attention to the role that assumptions regarding planner type and “omniscience” play in the 
Austrian and public choice critiques of planning. Section V concludes.  
II. Taking the worst case seriously in the Socialist 
Calculation Debate 
Robust political economy and worst-case thinking enjoy a rich heritage in political 
economy, tracing back through Hume’s dictum (cited earlier) to Mill’s warning: 
Whether the institution to be defended is slavery, political 
absolutism, or the absolutism of the head of a family, we are 
always expected to judge of it from its best instances; and we 
are presented with pictures of loving exercise of authority on 
one side, loving submission to it on the other – superior 
wisdom ordering all things for the greatest good of the 
dependents, and surrounded by their smiles and 
benedictions. All this would be very much to the purpose if 
any one pretended that there are no such things as good 
men. Who doubts that there may be great goodness, and 
great happiness, and great affection, under the absolute 
government of a good man? Meanwhile, laws and institutions 
require to be adapted, not to good men, but to bad.” (J.S. 
Mill, CW, vol. XXI, 287, italics added). 
Robustness considerations 8 therefore necessitate that we take Hume and Mill very seriously 
and focus on how institutions perform under worst-case conditions (e.g., where the 
supposition of planner benevolence in market socialist models is seriously weakened).  
Political systems that depend on idealized assumptions of disjoint incentives between 
planners and ordinary people may work well when the planners are truly idealized 
Philosopher-Kings, but do not work so well when the planners rejoin the human race.  A 
pessimistic analytical egalitarianism provides for robust foundations (see Levy 2002).    
The Austrian ‘economic’ critique of socialist planning – the ‘economic calculation 
argument’ associated with Ludwig von Mises (Mises 1935 [1920]) – argues that any socialist 
‘price’ vector (shadow or otherwise), while grossly suboptimal from the perspective of social 
efficiency, will, however, be wholly unbiased.  The calculation argument thus predicts 
generalized calculational chaos under socialist planning: some prices are set too low, while 
others are set too high relative to their market-clearing values. Thus, the Austrian prediction – 
namely, that unbiased but systematically erring planners will generate pervasive shortages 
and surpluses – contrasts starkly with the public choice prediction concerning the bias that is 
thought all-too likely to typify any real-world “centrally planned” price vector (Levy 1990): Self-
interested planners generate pervasive artificial shortages, which, as recognized by 
                                                 
8 Stiglitz (1994:106–107) states, “we can ask, is the model robust? Do slight changes in the 
assumptions —particularly the assumptions about which we may have limited confidence—result in 
marked changes in the conclusions?”   
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Rothbard9 (1976) generate rent -extracting opportunities for the planner-cum-price setter to 
exploit. Interestingly, Rothbard’s remarks echo those of Stigler (1975, x): whereas Austrians 
generally argue that the failures of socialist planning (e.g. pervasive shortages) are simply an 
instance of planner error, the public choice account suggests that planner error is largely a 
chimera – Austrian political economy has simply incorrectly specified the planner’s objective 
function.   
The Austrian critique of planner “omniscience” (Hayek’s “knowledge problem”) is 
clearly applicable to the characteristic 1930’s market socialist assumption that planners could 
easily acquire the information requisite for the formulation of a first-best efficient plan, whether 
through some Lange-type “trial and error” process or by solving a system of simultaneous 
equations ex-ante. H. D. Dickinson is representative in supposing that planners have 
sufficient information to ensure first-best efficiency:  
“On the basis of its experience with changing prices and quantities the statistical 
service of every sales agency would be able to draw up a demand schedule for each type of 
good sold … Under capitalism, demand schedules are apt to exist in the realm of faith rather 
than in that of works, but with the greater publicity and fuller statistics of the socialistic 
economy they would become much easier to draw up” (Dickinson 1939, p.63). 
Dickinson, of course, presupposes planner benevolence10, and with said 
benevolence, full or high calculative efficacy is clearly a boon irrespective of our welfare 
metric. Where planners are not wholly public-spirited, however, matters are not so simple. 
Public choice theory, while vigorously contesting the supposition of planner benevolence, 
suggests that low calculative efficacy may possess second-best efficiency properties. 
Interestingly, Dickinson’s joint ‘best-case’ supposition – planner benevolence conjunct with 
omniscience – raises the following rather intriguing public choice speculation: Suppose the 
planning authority has perfect information concerning consumer reservation prices (Dickinson 
(1939, 63, 191), why would planners of the self-interested rather than public-spirited variety 
not simply engage in perfect price discrimination (as would their self-interested private 
choosing counterpart were they in a similarly monopolistic position) – thereby extracting all 
surplus from hapless consumers?   
Intriguingly, Mises argues that planner type is utterly irrelevant to the socialist 
calculation debate (see also Hayek 1935, 2-3; 1986 [1944], 44):  
[T]he socialist economy is impracticable not because men 
are morally too base, but because the problems that a 
                                                 
9 “[H]ow could Mises know that some advocates of price control do not want shortages?  They may, for 
example, be socialists, anxious to use the controls as a step towards full collectivism. … Still others may 
favor price control, even after learning of the shortages, because they or their political allies will enjoy 
well-paying jobs or power in a price-control bureaucracy.” (Rothbard 1976, 102, italics added).  
10  See also Kornai: “Lange’s model is based on erroneous assumptions concerning the nature of the 
“planners.” The people at his Central Planning Board are reincarnations of Plato’s philosophers, 
embodiments of unity, unselfishness, and wisdom. They are satisfied with doing nothing else but strictly 
enforcing the “Rule,” adjusting prices to excess demand. Such an unworldly b ureaucracy never existed 
in the past and will never exist in the future” (Kornai 1986, italics added) 
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socialist order would have to solve present insuperable 
intellectual difficulties. The impracticability of Socialism is the 
result of intellectual, not moral, incapacity.  … Even angels, if 
they were endowed only with human reason, could not form 
a socialistic community. If a socialist community were 
capable of economic calculation, it could be set up without 
any change in men’s moral character (Ludwig von Mises 
[1932] 1981, 407, italics added). 
Mises, however, neglects to explain why planners of the self-interested rather than 
benevolent variety have any interest in attaining first-best efficiency per se.  11   
Taking Benevolence Seriously? 
Lavoie (1985b) suggests that the ‘knowledge’ problem and the ‘totalitarian’ problem 
(the Austrian ‘economic’ and ‘political’ critique of socialist planning and government 
intervention) are complementary arguments against planning.  Lavoie (1985b, p.20) notes:  
“[o]f the contemporary advocates of planning who consider 
the issue of past failures, most blame them on a lack of 
attention to democratic values, on the fact that the wrong 
personnel have been in charge, on a lack of statistical data, 
or on the supposition that its principles were not carried far 
enough. These rationalizations are not supported by the 
factual record and the primary arguments raised against 
national economic planning – which I will designate the 
“totalitarian problem” and the “knowledge problem” – are 
more fundamental and are almost completely unaddressed in 
contemporary planning proposals.”  
Nowhere, however, does Lavoie ask whether the Austrian ‘political’ critique of planning is truly 
congruent with the Austrian ‘economic’ critique of planning.  Does the strength (or relevance) 
of any one ‘Austrian’ argument (political or economic) simply serve to weaken whatever 
strength (or cogency) the other might have?  
 We suggest that the Austrian ‘political’ critique of socialism (the “totalitarian 
problem”) and the Austrian ‘economic’ critique of socialism (the “knowledge problem”) are 
rather incongruent with one another. If the “totalitarian problem” is the relevant worry, the 
“knowledge problem” is largely immaterial – or simply serves to attenuate the rapacity 
(surplus-extracting proclivities) of the planners.  By contrast, were we to follow Mises and 
Hayek in assuming public-spirited planners and in holding the “knowledge problem” as being 
the relevant concern, those planners, quickly recognizing the strength of the Mises critique, 
would eagerly retreat from the debacle of planning and institute a program of economic 
liberalization. Indeed, no Western democracy actually implemented a policy of wholesale 
planning during the twentieth century – democratic constraints (the selection effects for both 
policy and office-holders alike which are intrinsic to democratic ‘political markets’) apparently 
worked to dramatically attenuate – and ultimately to block – any move towards such planning 
                                                 
11 “What is there in public choice theory that also gives the lie to the planning advocates? We need only 
return to the ancient Roman query: Who is to guard the guardians? Planners are also utility-maximizing 
individuals, and who could predict that planning decisions will be made contrary to the interests of those 
who make them?” (Buchanan 1979b, p.272).  
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(see, e.g., Wiles 1967, p.18).  By contrast, any examples of twentieth-century experiments in 
wholesale planning are provided by countries akin to the Soviet Union, where non-benevolent 
agents both initiated the said experiments with planning and, because economic liberalization 
endangered their rents, vehemently resisted economic reform.   
Of course, Austrian critics of planning (e.g., Hayek 1944; Lavoie 1985b; Boettke 
2001) argue that the adverse selection mechanisms supposedly intrinsic to political markets 
(their workings being decidedly exacerbated in the case of wholesale economic planning), will 
operate to guarantee that any initial set of planners – benevolent by supposition and 
responsible for setting up the planning machinery, and wholly willing to reverse course if 
planning is socially inefficient – are replaced by a set of rather more malign planners (see, 
e.g., Chapter 10 of Hayek’s Road to Serfdom): The “worst” will rise to the top of the planning 
bureaucracy. Lavoie’s remarks are representative:  
“The totalitarian problem of planning, which its critics [e.g., 
Hayek 1944] have raised, was never claimed to be a 
consequence of the evil intentions of planning advocates, but 
rather of the kinds of institutions planning puts into place and 
the inherent dynamics [our italics] of these institutions … 
national economic planning involves by its very nature the 
concentration of immense political and economic power in a 
single agency … [this] concentration [of power] will naturally 
lend itself to abuse by those hungry for power and eminently 
competent in its exercise. It does not matter who initially is 
put in charge or how much that person and his or her 
employees emphasize or love democracy. [our italics]” 
(1985b, pp.20-21). 
Lavoie’s logic, however, appears rather lacking in empirical veracity. We remind the reader 
that Hayek’s argument that the worst would rise to the top in a planned economy was not 
intended as a purely abstract argument: The argument Hayek provided in The Road to 
Serfdom was supposed to apply to the post 1945 Labour government in Britain (Hayek 1994 
[1956], pp.xxxvii-xxxviii). Toye (2004, p.227, italics added) is apposite:  “[Stafford] Cripps 
himself admitted, the [1945 Labour] government’s determination not to violate its own 
democratic precepts meant that it could not take the measures necessary to guarantee the 
execution of its own plans.”  One may reformulate Lavoie’s “intrinsic dynamics” argument to 
argue that benevolent planners lack sufficient ideological flexibility to retreat from planning 
even once its failure becomes readily apparent (see, e.g., Boettke 2005). Any such argument, 
however, would need to adequately explain how the selection effects intrinsic to democratic 
politics work to get the relevant “single-minded idealists” (Hayek 1994, p.61) wholly lacking in 
ideological flexibility into the initial candidate pool (let alone into office).  Democratic 
constraints selecting for those particular public choosers who actually get to vote for or 
against the implementation of any policy of wholesale planning are surely of the utmost 
importance.  Thus, the extent to which such agents “love democracy” will determine their 
marginal willingness to trade-off the constraints of democratic politics for an ever more 
rigorous plan. Lavoie, of course, simply presupposes that a central planning authority is 
already in place. We suggest, however, that Austrian opponents of planning simply fail to 
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provide anything akin to an adequate explanation as to why benevolent agents initially adopt 
central planning, let alone why such agents would more vigorously pursue any such policy 
once the pervasive economic chaos supposedly inherent to planning rears its head.   These 
points aside for the moment, however, we suggest that Lavoie’s logic – assuming for the sake 
of argument that the Austrian “adverse selection” mechanism is accurate12 – suggests that 
the “knowledge problem” is a rather irrelevant critique of planning: The dynamics supposedly 
intrinsic to planning generate a Stalin-type or worst-case equilibrium13 whenever wholesale 
economic planning is attempted, irrespective of whether or not the said attempt is made by 
benevolent planners who in Lavoie’s words “love democracy”. Thus, it appears that from an 
Austrian political economy perspective, it is the “totalitarian” argument against planning which 
provides a far stronger critique of planning than the “knowledge problem” irrespective of 
planner type. Calculative efficacy may prove low, wholesale economic planning thereby 
generating pervasive deadweight losses, but any retreat from said planning is simply not 
possible (irrespective of whether planner type is public-spirited or self-interested): The 
institutional dynamics to which Lavoie makes reference supposedly militating against any 
possible retreat in the case of benevolent planners (who are replaced by Hayek’s ‘worst’), 
while non-benevolent planners, by contrast, while having no desire to retreat from planning 
anyhow, also have no desire to implement a socially efficient plan. Thus any claim that the 
planners have low calculative efficacy is immaterial; the benevolent-planners inevitably giving 
way to planners who are rather less benevolent (or downright malign), and having no desire 
to attain a first-best efficient outcome anyhow. Inability to calculate simply appears neither 
here nor there as regards the unfolding of the Austrian ‘planning leads to totalitarianism’ 
mechanism. 
An alternate interpretation of the “dynamics” inherent to planning is that the dynamics 
are contingent  on planners having low calculative efficacy per se (Hayek’s knowledge 
problem): without the failure of planning (pervasive calculational chaos), the conditions will 
never be ripe for the rise of the demagogue (e.g., Boettke 2001, 52).  This interpretation, 
however, leaves much to be desired.  Let us assume perfect calculative efficacy and initial 
planner benevolence.  As we discuss in Section III, the potential rents to be won by anyone 
capable of capturing the planning apparatus in such a case are huge.  Consequently, a non-
benevolent would-be planner will be willing to bid up to the full value of those potential rents in 
order to secure the position.  In order to maintain his position at the top of the apparatus, the 
benevolent planner will need to extract enough rents to defend his position (Crampton and 
Farrant, 2005).  More to the point, if we find the Boettke-Hayek-Lavoie mechanism sketched 
above at all persuasive, we would expect to see at least one data point where a benevolent 
planner, after having initially established the planning apparatus, was supplanted by a 
                                                 
12 “Hayek’s argument is an application of comparative advantage to the selection of leaders within the 
system.” (Boettke 2001, 52).   
13 What Cullenberg 1992, refers to as “hideous communism”. 
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Stalinist-type.  To the best of our knowledge, however, such a case does not exist.14  Where 
planning was initiated by the benevolent, a retreat from planning followed; where initiated by 
the non-benevolent, however, there was no retreat until the ultimate collapse.  The knowledge 
problem once again simply appears to take second stage to the totalitarian problem.    
Intriguingly, F. A. Hayek apparently agrees with our point that the economic 
calculation argument takes a role of secondary importance relative to the public-choice 
(incentives) critique of planning for the purpose of comparative institutional analysis.  
Anticipating Demsetz’s Nirvana critique (1969), Hayek insists that one cannot compare 
institutions (or sets of rules of the game) as they would operate under ideal conditions (e.g., 
planner benevolence) with relatively imperfect existing institutions. Thus, Hayek suggests that 
in comparing markets and planning,  
“[i]f the comparison is to be of any value … it has to be made 
on the assumption that either system is realized in the form 
which is most rational under the given conditions of human 
nature [planner type] and external circumstances which must 
of course be accepted” (1935, 38).   
If planner type (“human nature”) provides an important constraint upon which of various 
potential equilibria are more likely empirically, public choice theory clearly then takes 
precedence over Austrian political economy as a critique of planning. Thus we suggest that 
Austrian theory (particularly Hayekian strictures concerning imperfect information) has 
relatively little to add to the already existing corpus of worst-case theorizing (public-choice 
theory and constitutional political economy). Indeed, given the primacy of self-interested 
planner type, as we argue below, we ought to be thankful that self-interested planners cannot 
engage in rational economic calculation. Perfect information (ability to calculate) conjunct with 
planner self-interest generates the worst-case outcome: the perfectly-extracting Socialist 
Leviathan.  Given Hayek’s acceptance that analysis must proceed upon the acceptance of 
given planner type, it simply becomes immaterial whether would-be socialist planners can 
actually engage in rational economic calculation.  Irrespective of the possibility – or otherwise 
– of economic calculation under socialism, Hayek appears to cede that the principal relevant 
consideration is the fact that socialist planners lack any incentive to allocate resources so as 
to maximize social welfare per se. Indeed, given the worst-case assumption of homo 
economicus – or the “given conditions of human nature” (absence of non-homo economicus) 
as Hayek put it – quite the contrary is the case: planners will allocate resources to maximize 
their own personal well-being, irrespective of any deadweight losses that the resultant pattern 
of production and distribution might entail. 
                                                 
14 Wiles is apposite: “[T]he war economies of Western Europe … have completely disappeared. Even 
mere social democracy has taken a bad beating in Western Europe since the war, and retains a toehold 
in power only at the price of total Revisionism. Hayek rightly diagnosed the nature of the game, but he 
grossly misjudged the strengths of the players.” (Wiles 1967, p.18).  
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III.   The Worst worst-case? 
As we suggest above, given self-interested planners, the supposition of perfect 
information provides a worst-case assumption in public choice analysis.  Welfare increases as 
we relax the worst-case supposition that planners have unhindered ability to formulate and 
implement economic planning.  By welfare, we mean some measure of the utility enjoyed by 
the modal citizen; our results are robust to several alternative welfare measures.  A median 
welfare standard suffices (the level of utility enjoyed by the median citizen).  So too does any 
mean welfare standard (total societal utility divided by the number of people) that incorporates 
any non-trivial diminishing marginal utility of income – simply the idea that the marginal dollar 
appropriated by the central planner generates less utility for him than it would have provided 
to the citizen from whom it was taken.  Imperfect information conjunct with agency problems 
(cooperative inefficacy) and imperfect monitoring may improve outcomes.  
Our argument provides the ‘economic calculation’ complement to Cowen and Sutter’s 
(1999) agent-type critique of standard public-goods theory. Cowen and Sutter (1999) suggest 
that any increase in what they term “cooperative efficacy,” (p.161) will generate welfare gains 
and losses. When private or public choosers find it easier to engage in the degree of 
cooperation which is requisite if optimal (or near-optimal) private or public provision of public 
goods is to prove feasible, they can also more easily cooperate with one another to produce a 
variety of public bads (see Cowen and Sutter 1999, p.163). We suggest that any increase in 
planner ability to calculate may similarly prove a public bad where planners are self-
interested.  Whereas Cowen and Sutter (1999, p.161) refer to “cooperative efficacy,” we refer 
to the supposition of perfect information as “calculative” efficacy.  Indeed, Cowen and Sutter’s 
account complements the general thrust of our argument:.  Any posited increase in 
“cooperative efficacy” (given ‘worst-case’ planner type) will necessarily facilitate greater 
collusion among upstream and downstream monopolist-planners (thus reducing the potential 
‘defection’ inherent to any agency relationship), thereby facilitating more efficient joint 
bargaining over the distribution of the surplus extracted from consumers (Shleifer and Vishny 
1992). We suggest that ‘worst-case’ political economy ought to posit maximum “cooperative 
efficacy” along with perfect information (calculative efficacy) and planner self-interest. 
Figure 1: A taxonomy of incentives and efficacy. 
 Calculative Efficacy Cooperative Efficacy 
Benevolent Planners Desirable.  Allows for the 
formulation of the SWF-
maximizing plan. 
Desirable.  Allows for the 
implementation of the SWF-
maximizing plan. 
Self-Interested Planners Undesirable.  Allows for the 
calculation of maximal 
surplus extraction; output is 
maximized but is entirely 
expropriated. 
Undesirable.  Prevents 
individuals from colluding 
with lower levels of 
government for protection 
from higher levels; allows 
perfect price discrimination 
result to obtain. 
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The public-choice critique of planning traditionally posits that lower level planners 
(industry managers) efficiently collude with one another to extract surplus (bribes) from 
consumers (see, e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1992). Although such an assumption makes for 
analytical tractability (downplaying the importance of the ‘upstream-downstream’ monopolists 
problem familiar from intermediate industrial organization texts) we find it somewhat ad-hoc. 
Why do the ‘lower-level’ planners not readily engage in equally efficient collusion with ‘higher-
level’ planners (e.g., the state treasury)? Such collusion would entail that socialist industry 
managers maximize their rents by simply charging the ‘monopoly’ monetary price (extracting 
their rents like any standard monopolist) rather than, as traditional public-choice models of 
planning suppose, setting price below that at which the market clears and inefficiently 
extracting their rents in the form of bribes. Thus, public choice models apparently presuppose 
some degree of cooperative inefficacy.  
Less than full cooperative efficacy, however, possesses second-best efficiency 
properties. Full cooperative efficacy simply failed to obtain in the Soviet Union, and fortunately 
so. Under the full worst-case scenario, planners at all levels would collude successfully and 
bargain efficiently. Perfect information, conjunct with maximum cooperative efficacy and self-
interested planner type ensures maximal surplus extraction: The worst worst-case scenario 
thereby obtaining. We suggest that the traditional public-choice critique of planning provides a 
less than truly worst-case account on the grounds that although total income is lower (in result 
of inefficient rent-extraction and the prevalence of ‘upstream-downstream’ monopoly 
problems), citizen welfare is still somewhat greater than is the case in our suggested worst 
worst-case scenario.15 Indeed, as Cowen and Sutter (1999, 166) note, “the optimal level of 
cooperative efficacy is higher when leaders are altruistic rather than self-seeking.” Similarly, 
the optimal degree of calculative efficacy is higher when planner type is ‘benevolent’.    
From the perspective of total output maximization, planner type is irrelevant where full 
cooperative and calculative efficiency obtain – the distribution of surplus is irrelevant to any 
welfare ranking based only on total output.  Where full ‘calculative’ efficacy obtains, self-
interested planners select the socially optimal set of production projects, simply appropriating 
all resultant surplus for their own use. With less than full calculative efficacy, however, 
planners select self-enriching projects, irrespective of any divergence between the private and 
social costs of any such policy choice.  Either way, however, it is planner type (planner self-
interest), rather than calculative inefficacy per se, which is driving the story.   
                                                 
15 We assume away the possibility of free entry into the ‘industry’ of rent-extraction. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1993) suggest that mean and median income will (in the limit) converge on zero where entry into the 
‘corruption’ or ‘bribe extraction’ industry is totally free.  In the Shleifer and Vishny case, as N increases, 
deadweight losses increase concomitantly.  Alternatively, assume that maximal cooperative efficacy 
holds regardless of entry, and that the joint maximal level of extraction obtains regardless of N.    
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Figure 2: Calculation and Cooperation with Benevolent Planners 
 Calculative Efficacy Calculative Inefficacy 
Cooperative Efficacy Maximal mean and median 
welfare.  The efficient plan 
obtains. 
Planners grope towards SWF 
improvements.  Shortages 
are met with price increases 
and production increases; 
surpluses met with price 
reductions and production 
cutbacks.  Shortages and 
surpluses equally likely.  Plan 
is always updated to account 
for previous-period results.  
Equilibrium by trial and error. 
Cooperative Inefficacy Central planner knows the 
overall SWF maximizing 
plan; local agents implement 
local SWF maximizing plans 
instead.  Lose efficiencies of 
larger-scoped planning. 
Worst case.  Even the 
suboptimal plan cannot be 
implemented.  Pervasive 
economic irrationality and 
large deadweight losses 
result. Benevolent planners 
will retreat from planning. 
 
The self-interested planner – conjunct with calculative efficacy – will always provide 
the first-best efficient resource allocation since doing so allows for greater levels of surplus 
extraction.  Output is maximized while welfare reduces to epsilon.  From an output -based 
standard, a perfectly price discriminating leviathan is no worse than perfect competition.  
Where citizen welfare provides the relevant standard, however, the perfectly price 
discriminating socialist leviathan is the worst outcome.   
Where government agents are self-interested we suggest that ‘calculative’ inefficacy 
may possess second-best efficiency properties. Thus, from a welfare perspective, the socially 
optimal level of ‘calculative’ efficacy will decline if selection effects induce knavish agents 
(Hume) to pursue positions in the planning bureaucracy. Hayek (1944) argues that the “worst 
get on top” because the planners cannot calculate (see Boettke 1995). We argue that the 
worst are far more likely to “get on top” when ‘calculative’ efficacy obtains.16  Why select into 
the planning bureaucracy if opportunities for self-enrichment are few and far between?  
To illustrate our point concerning cooperative and calculative efficacy, consider the 
case of two levels of government, each with surplus extraction authority over an individual.  
Under assumptions of full cooperative and calculative efficacy, the two levels of government 
efficiently bargain between themselves over a division of extracted total surplus.  Calculative 
efficacy implies that each level of government can perfectly observe the individual’s full 
demand schedules and reservation utility levels, and cooperative efficacy implies that the 
levels of government work together towards full extraction.  From a welfare perspective, this is 
                                                 
16 A “realistic supposition is that governments pursue their own interests rather than the public interest 
… It is not obvious that we wish to increase cooperative efficacy in governments of this kind.” (Cowen 
and Sutter 1999, 168-169). Moreover, increasing “cooperative [calculative] efficacy for selfish 
governments may bring very high costs and also induce knavish politicians to pursue power” (169). 
Thus, we argue that Hayek’s “worst” are more likely to get on “top” where full calculative efficacy 
obtains. 
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the worst possible worst-case scenario.  The individual is left with the bare subsistence level 
of consumption.  
Now, let us relax the assumption of calculative efficacy while retaining that of full 
cooperative efficacy.  Both levels of government will cooperate in the attempt to extract the 
fullest possible amount of surplus from the individual. Failing full calculative efficacy, however, 
the government cannot restrict itself to taxing only inframarginal gains: deadweight losses 
result as individual behavior responds to the tax rates.  Though the total amount extracted will 
be lower than in the first case, the individual will be slightly better off. 17  From a welfare 
perspective, reductions in the amount of information available to the planning agency appear 
desirable despite the decline in total output. 
Relaxing now also the assumption of cooperative efficacy along with the supposition 
of full calculative efficacy, each of the two different levels of government attempts to maximize 
its own taxation revenue.  The local and regional levels of government attempt to extract 
quantities of surplus L and R from the individual; because they cannot restrict themselves to 
taxing inframarginal rents, however, they extract an amount equal to L + R < T, where T is the 
amount of extraction undertaken under conditions of full cooperative and calculative efficacy. 
We suppose the local level of government offers the individual taxpayer assistance in helping 
to misinform the regional level of government as to the individual’s available surplus.  In that 
case, the individual faces surplus extraction of L’ + R’ < L + R, where L’>L and R’<R.  The 
individual is left better off by reductions in the ability of planning agents to calculate and 
coordinate their surplus extraction activities.  When planning agents are self-interested, 
assumptions of full cooperative and calculative efficacy provide worst-case assumptions.  
Thus, where cooperative efficacy is less than perfect we should expect to see the center 
(seeking to maximize its share of the surplus) regularly rotating lower-level bureaucrats. 
Planner rotation weakens lower-level cooperative efficacy. Joseph Berliner (1952, p.362) 
notes the “relatively short tenure” in office of [Soviet] plant directors, arguing that such “fluidity 
of directors must impair the efficiency of management, and directors must lose a considerable 
amount of time in getting used to new plants.” Rotation, however, generates “beneficial 
consequences for the [Soviet] State, such as the disruption of a smoothly operating system of 
“mutual support” [lower-level cooperative efficacy or collusion] among officials who have 
worked together a long time in the same plant.” (1952, p.362). Full cooperative efficacy is 
clearly a boon where planner type is benevolent and a negative where planner type is 
selfish. 18 
                                                 
17 Olson (2000) provides an analysis of the Soviet Union under Stalin that complements our account: 
The Stalinist regime extracted surplus from the populace by taxing inframarginal wages very highly. 
Perfect information would have allowed the regime to engage in perfectly discriminatory taxation – 
thereby taxing away any surplus above that required for subsistence (Olson 2000, 125).  
18 “Low [cooperative-calculative] efficacy may have been preferable under the Soviet system, when the 
government did more good than bad” (Cowen and Sutter 1999, p.171).  
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Figure 3: Calculation and cooperation with Self Interested Planners 
 Calculative Efficacy Calculative Inefficacy19 
Cooperative Efficacy Maximal output; minimal 
welfare.  All surplus is 
efficiently extracted.  Worst-
case outcome from welfare 
perspective. 
Second-best efficiency in 
output.  Planners grope 
towards maximal extraction.  
Deadweight losses; 
individuals keep some 
surplus as planners cannot 
calculate full extraction price 
levels. 
Cooperative Inefficacy Welfare higher than in all but 
lower right hand quadrant.  
Efficient extraction plan 
devised by central 
government, but lower levels 
subvert, allowing consumers 
to keep some surplus in 
exchange for bribes. 
Second-best citizen welfare.   
 
IV.  Robust Political Economy? 
Recently, Peter Boettke and various co-authors have provided a reading of Hayek’s 
work – especially Hayek’s contributions to the socialist calculation debate – which places 
Hayek squarely within the ‘worst-case’ political economy tradition. Boettke et al build on their 
‘worst-case’ reading of Hayek in advocating an approach to worst-case political economy 
which, while maintaining a Buchanan-Hume type supposition of analytical egalitarianism 
regarding planner motivation - self-interest characterizes both private and public chooser alike 
– injects a decidedly Austrian flavour regarding information (see, e.g., Boettke 1999, Boettke 
and Lopez 2002, Boettke and Leeson 2004).   Elsewhere, Boettke (1999, pp. xxx) suggests 
that a truly robust political economy “must explore both sides of the intellectual coin of 
comparative institutional analysis: incentives and information.” Reiterating his earlier point, 
Boettke (2001, 332, italics added)20 states that a “robust political economy should work from a 
starting point which accepts neither benevolence nor omniscience. … There is a good case in 
human affairs for striving to build institutions from pessimistic assumptions  about motivation 
and knowledge, and thus guarding against the worst-case situations.” 
We argue here, however, that traditional worst-case theorizing à la Buchanan-Tullock 
is not necessarily incorrect in ignoring informational imperfections (Hayek’s “knowledge 
problem”) – and that the worst ‘worst-case’ scenario is one where public choosers are both 
self-interested and have full information. While Hayek rightly argues that poor quality 
information will plague any attempt by benevolent planners to rationally plan an economy, we 
argue that benevolent planners will (if we take benevolence seriously) surely retreat from 
planning once its failure becomes readily apparent. Alternatively, said would-be planners will 
never try a policy of wholesale command planning due to a variety of democratic constraints. 
                                                 
 
20 Boettke and Leeson (2004) further reiterate the point.   
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Peter Wiles is rather apposite: “It is difficult to reconcile parliamentary opposition and the rule 
of law with a command economy” (Wiles 1967, p.18). 21   
While a public choice reading of Hayek’s Road to Serfdom (1944) might suggest that 
planners are self-interested and thus will not retreat from planning (see, e.g., Boettke 1995), 
we argue that the supposition of planner self-interest makes the Austrian economic critique of 
planning (the calculation or ‘knowledge’ problem) either a largely irrelevant consideration – 
the planners are not seeking to attain first-best efficiency anyhow – or a constraint allowing for 
the second-best outcome: the knowledge problem attenuating the surplus-extracting venality 
characterizing self-interested planners.  When planners are not benevolent, irrespective of 
their putative information, first best solutions simply cannot obtain in welfare space.22  And in 
second-best worlds, we cannot expect that moves towards optimality measured in first-best 
space are necessarily desirable.  As Lipsey and Lancaster point out in their seminal article, if 
a constraint “prevents the attainment of one of the Paretian conditions, the other Paretian 
conditions, although still attainable, are, in general, no longer desirable.” (1956, p.11)  We 
argue that similar strictures hold in the designation of best-case and worst-case assumptions.  
Specifically, if one of the underlying assumptions that a political economy model makes 
concerning the state of the world fails to obtain, what serves as a worst-case assumption in 
the model can, in reality, prove something of a positive blessing.   
In a first-best world of benevolent planners, full calculative and cooperative efficacies 
are highly desirable on either a welfare or an output metric.  Thus, Boettke (2001, 332) and 
Boettke and Lopez (2002) argue that perfect information (calculative efficacy) is clearly a 
best-case assumption.  We suggest, however, that they cannot relax assumptions of planner 
benevolence while simultaneously insisting that Austrian informational assumptions provide 
robust worst-case foundations.23  Stand-alone assumptions of planner “benevolence” or 
“omniscience” cannot be designated as either worst-case or best-case suppositions per se 
(see, e.g., Boettke 1999, 2001; Boettke and Leeson 2004): Whether any particular 
informational (or motivational) supposition provides a best-case or worst-case assumption is 
not independent of whatever complementary supposition the theorist makes regarding 
planner type (or “omniscience”).  Where planners are self-interested, Austrian suppositions 
regarding imperfect information provide an inadequately “pessimistic” assumption about 
planner “knowledge” (contra Boettke 2001, 332; Boettke and Leeson 2004).  Calculative 
inefficacy may prove a boon where planners are wholly self-interested.  In the second-best 
world of self-interested planners, neither full coordinative nor calculative efficacy is 
                                                 
21 Wiles intriguingly suggests that the trades unions may have acted as a veto player blocking any move 
towards Hayek’s ‘serfdom’ in post-war Britain. Government mandated wage freezes (surely an early 
step towards serfdom according to Hayekian logic) are not going to work “where trade unions are strong 
and it is held that law ought to rule … [the policy provides] a tremendous historical affirmation that 
socialism excludes collective bargaining and socialist parties [e.g,, the Labour Party] must not be paid 
by trade unions … in a society such as ours is, … it is a complete non-starter” (Wiles 1976, pp.18-19). 
22 Of course, under cooperative and calculative efficacy, first best output can obtain.  The planner 
extracts all surplus.   
23 Benson’s remarks (2002, 253) are particularly apposite: “it may be that dropping the benevolence 
assumption does “substantively” alter the conclusions of Austrian political economy.”   
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necessarily desirable. To assume full calculative and cooperative efficacies is to make a truly 
worst-case assumption. 
V.   Conclusion: Are Two Vices Preferable to One? 
Robust political economy requires analytical egalitarianism as a starting point; this is, 
however, a necessary rather than a sufficient condition: while an assumption that all are alike 
in their omniscience, omnipotence and beneficence satisfies analytical egalitarianism, such 
an assumption would not prove a solid grounding for robust political economy.  We have 
shown that the best or worst case nature of particular assumptions regarding knowledge and 
incentives are entirely contingent on the joint assumptions made regarding their respective 
motivational or informational counterpart.  While perfect calculative efficacy in our socialist 
calculation example might seem a very optimistic and “best case” assumption, it is necessary 
when the Austrian assumption of benevolence is weakened.  With less than perfect 
benevolence, perfect information hardly provides a best case scenario.  Consequently, while 
Boettke’s relaxing of the benevolence assumption within Austrian political economy may yield 
important insights, it will not provide the robust foundations he seeks.  A robust and 
analytically egalitarian political economy must apply Hume’s dictum without recourse to 
Austrian informational considerations. 
More to the point, relaxing the benevolence assumption within Austrian political 
economy helps us better to see the root of the Soviet system’s undesirability.  Mises and 
Hayek persuasively argued that even benevolent planners could not engage in the kind of 
economic calculation that would be necessary to create an efficient planned economy.  Mises 
and Hayek, however, failed to provide any coherent explanation as to why a benevolent 
planner would inexorably set down the road towards full-blown central planning, or to 
coherently explain the institutional dynamic preventing a benevolent planner from turning 
away from central planning, once the economic problems supposedly inherent in that system 
became apparent.  Absent non-benevolent agents, we can have little explanation as to why 
central planning would proceed beyond the first famines.  Regardless of Stalin’s ability to 
engage in rational economic calculation, one would not wish to be one of his subjects; the 
knowledge problem is at worst irrelevant and at best ameliorative when Stalin rules.  We 
argue that a great deal will depend on the nature of the agent instituting central planning and 
on the institutional framework within which he operates.  In no case has full central planning 
ever been initiated by benevolent agents who were supplanted by despots, as in Hayek’s 
story; real world central planners were non-benevolent ex ante.  Contrarily, much of Western 
Europe started down the road to central planning in the years following the Second World 
War; but, when problems emerged, their governments turned back from planning and 
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nationalization, preferring a welfare state to the totalitarian apparatus that would be necessary 
to implement full scale planning. 24   
Intriguingly, Don Lavoie (1985b, p.214) remarks that it is “fundamentally misleading to 
view planning in practice only as a failure to achieve … progressive ideals … I think it can just 
as well be said that planning in practice has been a stunning success in achieving some 
entirely different goals … the legacy of practical planning procedures traces to an 
unambiguously reactionary beginning.” Thus Lavoie - thereby apparently undercutting his 
claim that the knowledge problem and totalitarian problem are complementary arguments 
against planning rather than substitutes – clearly recognizes what was so readily apparent to 
Frank Knight during the calculation debate: From the perspective of planner self-interest the 
‘failure’ of planning is no failure whatsoever. Lavoie is apposite: “Stalinism … is not an 
aberration or a betrayal of true planning or a failure of its designers to attain Marxist ideals 
but, rather, a successful realization of reactionary ideals” (p.215).25  The “totalitarian problem” 
always outweighed the “economic problem”; consequently, the “economic problem” 
highlighted by Mises and Hayek proves something of a boon to those living under a socialist 
system.  As robust political economy seeks to guard against the worst case scenario, 
maintaining a narrow focus on the problem of governing the governors seems best. 
Our paper began with Hume’s warning concerning political knavery. In Hume’s 
terms,26 the welfare losses attributable to one vice (or imperfection), namely, that of planner 
self-interest, are attenuated by that of low calculative efficacy. Thus, to cure one vice (low 
calculative efficacy), without also replacing planner self-interest with planner benevolence, 
would simply exacerbate welfare losses.   
                                                 
24 “[T]hey [the Labour government] moved towards a final acceptance of a planning machine that had no 
executive power, and which has been compared with a mere ‘think tank’ … This was partly because … 
there many direct obstacles to the creation of a planned economy in Britain. Equally, these institutional 
barriers were complemented and reinforced by the clear inhibitions to comprehensive planning inherent 
in the ideology and structure of the Labour movement itself” (Toye 2004, pp.236-237, italics added). “[I]t 
might well be argued … the Atlee government’s policy in the 1940’s was merely interventionism under 
the barest veneer of planning” (Toye 2004 pp.4-5). “Herbert Morrison told the [1945] party conference, 
‘this document [the Labour party manifesto] Let us Face the Future may be described as Labour’s Five 
Year Plan’ … [W]hen discussing the reconstruction of Britain, he [Morrison] was not afraid to refer to the 
Soviet example … [The manifesto] had in practice about as much connection to a Russian plan as 
Churchill’s four-year plan had to Goering’s. There was no commitment to establish any form of supreme 
economic authority. Substantial ‘constructive enterprise and private endeavour’ would co-exist with 
publicly owned industries … perhaps the stronges t planning commitment, the national investment board, 
was abandoned by Labour in power” (pp.154-155).  
25 “The monopoly power of the Communist party and its government bureaucrats was successfully 
secured [by Stalin]; the economic system was brought to serve the interests of a New Class” (Lavoie 
1985b, p.229). Throughout the socialist calculation debate, Frank Knight argued that the technical issue 
of socialist calculation per se was not truly germane to the planning versus markets debate: “Theory and 
current experience warrant the gravest doubts as to whether the human group in command of a 
collectivist economy would make any serious effort to find for socio-economic problems [first-best] 
solutions of the form taken for granted by Professor Pigou and other l iberals” (Knight 1938b, p.243). 
Similarly, Knight argued that a “socialistic government would not try intelligently to function in accord 
with economic principles in securing maximum satisfaction of the economic needs of the masses” 
(Knight 1938a, p.268, i talics added).  
26 See the epigram. 
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